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Consumer Perceptions of Online Transaction Security - A Cognitive Explanation of 
the Origins of Perception 
 
Easwar A. Nyshadham, Department of Aviation Business Administration, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical 
University, nyshadhe@cts.db.erau.edu  
 
 
     “Many consumers visit the Travelocity site, but it takes 
as many as five visits to generate a single booking, and 
many people look but never book at all. Why? The 
primary reason given for this hesitancy is the fear of 
credit card theft or fraud. Even among those persons who 
made a reservation, a study showed that some three out of 
five agreed with the statement that sending a credit card 
over the Internet was "just plain stupid." The fact is that 
the chances of fraud or theft with respect to credit card 
transactions on the Internet are far less than for 
transactions using cash registers, fax machines, the mails, 
and the telephone. Yet, nagging doubt persists, and 
consumer perceptions are of course reality(emphasis 
ours). We will continue to work with Mastercard and 
other leaders to develop standards for secure electronic 
transactions that will alleviate these fears. In the 
meantime, the government can help by letting the public 
know that electronic transactions are safe." 
 
by CEO of Travelocity, April 1998, Testimony before 
House Committee 
 
“While many consumers are visiting online retailers, few 
are buying. The study argues that online retailers need 
to improve convenience and value for consumers and 
assist them in overcoming their fears around security. 
Retailers must also provide reluctant consumers with 
compelling reasons for accepting the Internet as a new 
way to shop(emphasis ours). Some of these reasons 
might include the use of consumer assurance brands and 
enhanced levels of convenience, customization, selection, 
service and pricing.” 
 
From the Executive Summary of a study conducted by 
Boston Consulting Group, for Shop.Org, March 1999 
Abstract 
 
     An important impediment to the success of business to 
consumer ecommerce is the consumer perception 
regarding the riskiness of the online channel. A widely 
held perception among consumers is that financial 
transactions on the Internet are inherently more risky and 
not secure. Interestingly enough, most security experts 
would view Internet transaction as, in fact, more secure 
than traditional transactions. The persistence of this 
misperception is therefore, quite surprising. 
 
     In this research, we focus on consumers’ perceptions 
of online risks.  We suggest that the consumer risk 
perceptions also arise from some well-known cognitive 
biases that decision-makers (consumers) are typically 
subject to. Taking an information processing view of 
customer decision making, we provide a subset of 
cognitive biases, which affect consumer judgments in 
information acquisition, alternative valuation and learning 
from evidence. Theoretical and limited experimental 
evidence is provided. 
 
Keywords: Electronic Commerce, Internet, security, 
privacy, B2C commerce, online risks, heuristics, 
cognitive biases 
 
Section 1: Risks in B2C Online Ecommerce 
and Research Questions 
 
     There is a widely held perception among consumers 
that informational flows associated with online 
transactions are much less secure than the flows in 
traditional transactions. Three issues of managerial 
importance emerge from such a perception. The first 
quote summarizes the first issue: consumers subject to 
such a perception may either not transact online at all or 
may only partially consummate the transaction on the 
Internet i.e., consumers may “look” but not “book” 
online. The second issue arises from the second quote: to 
the extent that such a perception exists, do consumers 
have to be provided additional compensation or 
“compelling reasons” for engaging in online transactions? 
The third issue follows from the above two – if the 
security concerns are merely a perceptual issue and not 
based on objective evidence, then why can’t the industry 
merely communicate to the consumers that their 
exaggerated perceptions are incorrect?  
 
     In this research, we examine a descriptive theory of 
decision making (e.g., Prospect Theory) and identify 
heuristics/biases which can explain the questions raised 
above. The three research questions are stated as follows: 
 
R1: Do cognitive biases affect consumer perception of 
online transaction risk? 
R2: Do cognitive biases affect the “compensation” 
demanded by consumers for transacting online? 
R3: Do cognitive biases affect how consumers process 
objective risk information? 
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Section 2: Security Perceptions  
  
     Numerous surveys (Anonymous 1997a, 1997b, 1998a, 
1998b, 1998c, 1998d, 1999a, 1999b) have been conducted 
to understand consumer perceptions of online 
transactions. Two primary “sources of friction” for online 
transactions that emerge from a summary of the studies 
are i) security concerns and ii) privacy concerns. Rose et. 
al., (1999) conducted a comprehensive review of 
technological impediments to business to consumer 
electronic commerce and suggest that security is the most 
important issue facing business to consumer ecommerce. 
In this research, we view security as the primary 
determinant of consumer trust and hence focus on this 
issue. 
 
     The consumer perception that Internet transactions are 
insecure is quite surprising. Numerous technology experts 
refute the claim that transacting on the Internet by sending 
credit card information or other important personal 
information is any less secure than transacting otherwise 
(See, for example, the quote by the CEO of Travelocity). 
It is likely that encrypted information flows are the least 
significant source of security risks. Second, the most 
significant risks for security may arise from the internal 
security policies and procedures adopted by firms (Cohen, 
1996). Segev et. al. (1998) suggest that the most sever 
security threat may in fact be the “emancipated corporate 
computer user”. 
      
     To summarize, numerous independent surveys have 
found that, consumer concerns about security and privacy 
far outweigh their other concerns such as usability of the 
web site, download delays, search problems, interface 
limitations etc. From a consumer perspective, it is likely 
that security is primarily a perceptual issue – i.e., 
consumers systematically misjudge the risks in online 
transactions. Consumer perceptions that online 
transactions are insecure, we submit, arise from cognitive 
heuristics they employ in understanding and evaluating 
risks. The heuristics or “rules of thumb” employed by 
consumers lead to systematic misperceptions or cognitive 
biases.  
 
Section 3: Security perceptions and  
Cognitive Biases 
  
     Normative theories of decision making, such as the 
Subjective Expected Utility Theory (SEU theory) describe 
how a decision makers ought to behave. In contrast, 
descriptive theories, such as the Prospect Theory (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1992), focus on how consumers behave 
rather than how they ought to behave. This stream of 
literature (Kahneman & Tversky 1983, Slovic & 
Lichtenstein 1982) argues that humans are subject to 
biases, which are perceptual in origin. When faced with a 
decision problem, humans employ heuristics to simplify 
processing of information. However, to the extent that 
heuristics are “rules of thumb”, they are not always 
accurate. Application of heuristics, therefore, can lead to 
systematic errors in judgment.  
 
     The research questions and the relevant biases 
organized by stage of human information processing are 
summarized in Table 1. 
 
a) Information Acquisition Stage: 
 
     When making decisions under uncertainty, people 
“code” objective probabilities of events presented to them 
into subjective probabilities or “decision weights” prior to 
decision making. The function used to convert true 
probabilities to decision weights is S-shaped and flat at 
lower end, as shown in Figure1. (Tversky and Kahneman 
1992, Camerer and Ho 1994, Tversky and Fox 1995, Wu 
and Gonzalez 1996, Gonzalez and Wu 1999). The 
implication of a consumer using such a function is that, 
individuals attach the same subjective probability to all 
events below a certain probability threshold. 
 
Figure 1: Normative probabilities versus 
 
                     Decision Weights 























An Illustration of Coding Bias: Assume that a consumer 
initially views an unencrypted web site as having a small 
risk p=.001(say) of being hacked. Assume the vendor 
upgrades security through an appropriate mechanism and 
lowers the risk to one in a quadrillion (i.e., p=1/1015). If 
the threshold of probability for the consumer is (say) .001, 
then she consumer would perceive the same risk for even 






Represents the true probability of an event taking place. 
A rational consumer would provide the same decision 
weight to the event as the true probability.  
The curved line represents the subjective probability 
that a decision maker attaches to a true probability. For 
example, small and extremely small probabilities are 
perceived to be the same by a decision-maker. 










Stage of Information 
processing 




Understanding of probabilities 
of risky events 
Consumers fail to distinguish between 
very low probabilities and low 
probabilities and behave as if they are 
nearly the same./ Decision weights 
used in place of true probabilities 
Probability of online 
security risk is 
overestimated. 
R1: Do cognitive biases 
affect consumer 
perception of online 
transaction risk? 
 
Support: Literature Information Acquisition: 
Understanding of probabilities 
of risky events 
Concrete and vivid examples of past 
risky events, rather than frequency, 
are used to judge the probability of 
occurrence of events in the future/ 
Availability and Concreteness 
heuristics 
Probability of online 
security risk is 
overestimated. 
R2: Do cognitive biases 
affect the “compensation” 
demanded by consumers 
for transacting online? 
 
Support: Literature 
Evaluation of Alternatives: 
Valuing a gamble 
In comparing online versus traditional 
offerings, if consumers view the 
online channel as riskier, the 
perceived value of the online offering 
will be much lower to the consumer 
than the rational theory would 
suggest/ Loss Aversion Phenomenon. 
The value of a good 
sold online is 
underestimated. 
R3: Do cognitive biases 
affect how consumers 
process objective risk 
information? 
 
Support: Literature and 
an Experiment 
Attribution of Causes and 
Effects: 
Formation of a mental model 
of risks and causal attributions 
Statistical data and expert judgments 
will not be used to correct 
misperceptions./ Neglect of consensus 
information in attribution and the base 
rate neglect biases. 
Online transactions will 
continue to be perceived 
as risky, regardless of 
how sound and 
statistically valid 
evidence to the contrary 
is.  
 
     Kahneman and Tversky (1983) describe a second 
cognitive bias, which also serves to exaggerate risk 
perception in consumers. They state that when people 
assess the probability of an event, the ease with which 
salient instances or occurrences, which are readily 
“available” for recall determine the value assessed. The 
judgmental heuristic used here is called availability. 
However, availability in memory is affected by how 
vividly prior instances of the event were described to a 
subject. Slovic et.al., (1983) argue that concrete 
illustrations of a phenomenon make them more available, 
so that they are easily recalled from memory by human 
decision-makers and used as proxies for estimation of 
likelihood of an event.. 
 
Illustration of Availability and Concreteness: In the 
past, media has focused a lot of attention on hackers 
(Slatalla and Quittner 1995, Stoll 1989.) Further, the 
breaking of the 40-key encryption code used by Netscape 
browser in earlier versions, as well as the 56-bit DES 
encryption code are also public knowledge and are 
discussed in textbooks dealing with electronic commerce 
(Kalakota and Whinston 1996). To the extent that a 
customer can recall the security incidents vividly, she will 
overstate the probability of hacking or a general security 
incident. 
 
     To summarize, the two cognitive phenomena described 
above explain why the probability of a risky event, such 
as hacking, may be exaggerated by most consumers. The 
first bias suggests that consumers do not distinguish 
between low and extremely low probability events and 
perceive them as if they were nearly the same. The second 
bias (availability) suggests that concrete illustrations of 
phenomenon, rather than frequency of the phenomenon, 
influence probability judgment. The overall impact of 
these biases is that, a human decision maker would 
systematically overestimate the security risks in online 
transactions. Hence, consumers would perceive the 
Internet as more risky than it actually is. 
 
b) Valuing Alternatives 
 
     According to Kahneman and Tversky (1983), “losses 
loom larger than gains”.  It may be argued that people use 
the traditional, offline transaction channels as a frame of 
reference when evaluating online transactions. To the 
extent that online channels are considered to be riskier, 
consumers may perceive a potential loss in transacting 
online. Using traditional utility theory, one would assume 
that a consumer should be offered a “risk premium” to 
make her indifferent between using the traditional channel 
versus the online channel. Under prospect theory, 
however, the disutility of an online transaction, being a 
perceived loss, is higher than rational theory would 
suggest. Ceteris paribus, the risk premium or the 
“compensation” demanded by a consumer under Prospect 
Theory will be larger than the risk premium computed 
under rational theories. 
 
     Assume that a consumer perceives the offline channel 
as risk free. However, on the online channel, a consumer 
may perceive that a small probability p exists of a loss of 
839
  
$M, say due to credit card fraud. This creates an added 
disutility to the consumer. Therefore, to make a consumer 
indifferent between buying online versus offline, a 
“compensation” or risk premium has to be offered to the 
consumer. Given a utility function for the consumer and 
specific values for probability p and potential loss $M, a 
risk premium can be computed.  
 
     The magnitude of risk premium would be higher under 
Prospect Theory.  Prospect theory would suggest that 
consumers would now use a local utility function, 
centered on the frame of reference, which has a much 
steeper slope for perceived losses than perceived gains. 
Correspondingly, the disutility of buying online is higher 
and therefore, to compensate for this higher disutility, a 
larger “compensation” or risk premium needs to be 
offered.  
 
     This argument is presented in Figure 2. Consumer 
utility is plotted on the y-axis and the dollar amounts 
corresponding to a loss of $M (hence -$M) is plotted on 
x-axis. The POffline Channel represents the frame of reference. 
The consumer is assumed to have a globally concave, 
risk-averse utility function which is standard in utility 
theory. A potential loss of $M has a disutility 
corresponding to the intercept on y-axis of D1. The 
prospect theory utility function is centered around the 
current frame (price in an offline channel) and is much 
steeper for losses than gains. The corresponding disutility 
is D2 which is higher than D1, the disutility under 
standard theory. The corresponding expected disutility 
under prospect theory will also be higher (probability of 
loss, p, is not shown in the figure.).  
 
Illustration of Loss Aversion: To make this argument 
concrete, assume that a widget is being sold offline for 
Poffline channel of $10.  When the same widget is sold online, 
due to the added risk, assume that a standard 
“compensation” of E(-$M,p)=$-1 has to be offered to 
make a consumer indifferent to buying the product online 
versus offline. Under prospect theory, the expected 
disutility has to be larger than $1, say $2. The price of 
widget, under loss aversion is, therefore, $8. The impact 
of loss aversion is that goods sold online will be 
undervalued, ceteris paribus. 
 


































c) Attribution Biases and Consumer        
    Learning 
 
     To the extent that industry experts believe that online 
transactions are not as insecure, it would seem that 
communicating the lower risks is a solution to the 
problem. If consumers are provided with objective 
information on risks, will they discard their original 
perceptions and use the objective information in their 
decision making?  
 
     In an experiment designed to answer this question, 50 
undergraduate subjects enrolled in a business school were 
informed that in a typical Internet transaction, five parties 
are usually involved and each one contributes to the 
riskiness of the transaction. The parties are: buyer, seller, 
the insecure channel, a financial intermediary such as a 
credit card company and the Internet Service Provider 
(ISP). Subjects were initially asked to provide a 
subjective estimate of risks arising out of each party 
involved in an online transaction, using a constant sum 
100 point scale. Following this, they were provided with 
hypothetical base rates i.e., seemingly objective 
probabilities of how likely each party would have been 
responsible for a security incident. 
 
     Next, a vignette was provided to the students in which, 
a hypothetical consumer makes an online purchase and 
finds out three months later, that there was suspicious 
activity on his credit card. The vignette was carefully 
structured to be completely uninformative. Subjects were 




Globally risk-averse utility function of a consumer under 
rational theory 
-M 
Local Loss aversion function around frame of reference 
D1: Disutility of 
a potential loss of 
M with a 
traditional utility 
function 
D2: Disutility of 







indicate the probability that each party was responsible. A 
copy of the instrument is available from the author. 
 
     The mean perceived risks for each party, aggregated 
across subjects, are plotted on the y-axis in Figure.4. The 
first set of columns refers to the subjective mean risks 
provided by subjects at the beginning of the experiment. 
The second set of columns displays the researcher-
provided base rates i.e., seemingly objective probabilities 
based on a fictitious study. Subjects participating in the 
experiment did not know this during the study, but were 
debriefed later on. The third set of columns refer to the 
probabilities assigned to various parties by students, after 
they are exposed to the base rates and the vignette. 
 
     Since the vignette itself is uninformative, subjects will 
have to make judgments of risks based on prior 
information. If subjects persisted with their original 
perceptions, then the distribution of risks across parties in 
perceived and judged cases should be nearly the same. 
The hypothesis is stated formally as follows: 
 
H1: Judged probabilities (third set of columns) come 
from the same distribution as the perceived probabilities 
(first set of columns) 
 
     A Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test for equality of two 
sample distributions was rejected at 0.05 level (D*=2.6), 
suggesting that original perceptions were modified during 
the experiment. A second K-S Test was conducted to test 
if the treatment had an effect, i.e., judged probabilities 
had the same distribution as the base rates. The hypothesis 
is stated as follows: 
 
H2: Judged probabilities (third set of columns) come 
from the same distribution as the base rates (second set of 
columns). 
 
     A Kolomogorov-Smirnoff test for equality of 
perceived and base rate distributions led to a rejection of 
the null that the two distributions were equivalent at 0.05 
level (D*=1.94). This would suggest that subjects, in 
judging fault based on the uninformative vignette, did not 
use the base rate information.  
 
     The results from the experiment may be summarized 
as follows: subjects judgments indicate that neither their 
original perceptions, nor the base rates are being used. 
Communicating seemingly objective base rates to the 
subjects did not result in subjects using the base rates. 
Difficulty in communicating risks, therefore, is a 
significant issue for online security perceptions. 
 
 
Section 5: Summary 
 
     Current research on electronic commerce security is 
focused on the technical aspects such as vulnerabilities, 
risks, mechanisms and security frameworks etc. 
Increasing evidence suggests that consumers perceive the 
online channel as more risky than traditional channels. 
Such perceptions may be best explained as arising out of 
well known cognitive biases that consumers are subject 
to. 
 
     Cognitive biases literature provides a theoretical basis 
for suggesting that i) security risks will be exaggerated by 
consumers, ii) the “compensation” sought by consumers 
may be more than what traditional theory would suggest, 
ceteris paribus, and iii) such perceptions may be difficult 
to change. The implied hypotheses may be tested in an 
empirical and/or experimental setting. In this research, we 
provide experimental evidence to answer the third 
research question which suggests that consumers are 
likely to ignore seemingly objective evidence and 
therefore, it would be difficult to communicate online 
transaction risks.    
 
     Future research may focus on further clarifying and 
extending the role of cognitive biases in security 
perceptions. In this research, theoretical support was 
provided for the first two research questions and 
experimental evidence was provided for the third research 
question. Experimental tests of the first two research 
questions will also be an important step in understanding 
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